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Supreme Court rules post-bail conduct irrelevant in appeal against grant of bail

THE Supreme Court, recently held that the conduct of an accused after being granted bail cannot form a valid consideration while deciding an appeal against the grant of bail, clarifying that such conduct is only relevant in proceedings for cancellation of bail.

A Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and Vijay Bishnoi, in a judgment delivered in February 2026, set aside an order of the Madhya Pradesh High Court that had granted anticipatory bail to an accused who had remained absconding for nearly six years. The judgment, authored by Justice Bishnoi, rejected the accused’s contention that his post-bail conduct should be considered a valid ground to dismiss the complainant’s appeal challenging the bail order.

The Court observed that, “…post-bail conduct is never a valid consideration while dealing with an appeal against grant of bail, and such conduct is only relevant in an application for cancellation of bail.”

Relying on its earlier decision in Ashok Dhankad v. State of NCT of Delhi and Another, the Bench noted that at the appellate stage, the scrutiny is confined to examining whether the impugned bail order suffers from perversity, illegality, or inconsistency with settled law.

The case arose from an incident in June 2017 involving political rivalry between two groups, which led to the registration of three FIRs.

The complainant alleged that the accused, along with others, attacked his party, resulting in the death of one Bablu Chaudhary and injuries to Shailendra alias Pintu. The third FIR, which was the subject matter of the proceedings, was filed under sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 294, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act, 1959.

While the co-accused faced trial and were acquitted by the trial court in June 2023, the present accused did not participate in the proceedings and remained absconding throughout.

He subsequently filed a third anticipatory bail application before the High Court, which disposed of the application by directing him to surrender before the trial court and move an application for regular bail. The High Court further directed that the trial court shall grant bail to the accused on the same day after imposing adequate conditions.

The complainant challenged this order before the Supreme Court, arguing that parity cannot be claimed by an absconding accused and that the acquittal of co-accused was based on evidence specific to them, having no bearing on the accused who had evaded trial. The complainant relied on Lavesh v. State (NCT of Delhi) to contend that an absconder is not entitled to the relief of anticipatory bail.

The accused, on the other hand, argued that there were no allegations of post-bail misconduct or violation of bail conditions against him, and that this should be considered a valid ground to dismiss the appeal.

The Supreme Court found the High Court’s reasoning to be “completely erroneous and perverse.” It noted that, “…the said consideration is completely erroneous and perverse in an anticipatory bail application, especially when the accused had been absconding for about 6 years and made a mockery of the judicial process.” The Court held that the accused cannot be permitted to “encash” on the acquittal of the co-accused persons.

The Bench further clarified that any findings recorded by the trial court, whether in favour of or against an absconding accused, are wholly irrelevant while considering his bail application.

Since the accused had not faced trial, the prosecution was under no obligation to produce evidence against him during the co-accused’s trial. Relying on the full bench decision of the Kerala High Court in Moosa v. Sub-Inspector of Police, the Court emphasised that proceedings against an absconding accused stand on a different footing, and conclusions drawn in a split-up trial cannot automatically benefit one who deliberately avoided participation.

The Court cautioned that granting anticipatory bail to an absconder sends a dangerous message. It observed that, “It is apposite to mention that granting the relief of anticipatory bail to an absconding accused person sets a bad precedent and sends a message that the law-abiding co-accused persons who stood trial, were wrong to diligently attend the process of trial and further, incentivises people to evade the process of law with impunity.”

The Court also took note of allegations that the accused had threatened an injured eyewitness in 2019, leading to the registration of a separate FIR, as well as his multiple criminal antecedents. In these circumstances, the High Court’s order granting anticipatory bail was held to be perverse and unjustified.

Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, and the accused was directed to surrender before the concerned court within four weeks. The Court clarified that after surrender, the accused would be free to seek regular bail, which shall be decided in accordance with law without being prejudiced by the observations made in the judgment.

Advocate Vindhya Mehra appeared for the appellant and Advocate Maitreyee Jagat Joshi appeared for the accused.

Case: Balmukund Singh Gautam v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. [2026 INSC 157]

FAQs

1. Can post-bail conduct be considered while deciding an appeal against grant of bail?

No. The Supreme Court in Balmukund Singh Gautam v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2026) held that post-bail conduct is never a valid consideration in an appeal against grant of bail. Such conduct is only relevant in an application for cancellation of bail.

2. Is an absconding accused entitled to anticipatory bail in India?

Generally, no. The Supreme Court has held that an absconder is not entitled to anticipatory bail as a general rule. However, in exceptional cases where no prima facie case is made out against the absconding accused, the court may exercise discretion to grant such relief.

3. Can an absconding accused claim parity with acquitted co-accused to seek bail?

No. The Supreme Court clarified that an absconding accused cannot benefit from the acquittal of co-accused persons. Since the prosecution is not required to lead evidence against an absconder during the trial of co-accused, findings in such trials cannot be used by a fugitive to claim parity.

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